How much expertise did we have in the past?

The latest report from the House of Lords European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine, has, quite justifiably, had a great deal of media attention. I wish more of those reports did - they tend to be very well researched and clearly argued. This one caught the media's attention because it was dealing with political events that are unfolding in an urgent manner and because it, again justifiably, criticized very strongly, indeed, the government, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Foreign Ministries of other EU member states and the EU itself, particularly the European External Action Service (EEAS). The immediate response from the FCO, which bleatingly tried to explain that nobody could have predicted anything merely proved that the report was accurate in its assessment of that institution.

There are various aspects to the report, which will need to be analyzed but, to start with, I should like to focus on something that has been repeated many times in the last few years as Russia morphed from a relatively friendly power (that was a long time ago) to an unfriendly and, more recently, completely hostile one: and that is that we, Britain as well as other EU member states no longer have the analytical capacity to understand what is going on there and to predict possible actions on that country's part.

In fact, Paragraph 62 states:

Sir Tony Brenton believed that UK diplomacy was "pretty good", but that it had "suffered because of a loss of language skills, particularly in the Foreign Office." This had had a direct effect on the capacity of the FCO to respond to recent events. There was "quite lot of complaint in Whitehall after the annexation of Crimea that the Foreign Office had not been able to give the sort of advice that was needed at the time."

Speaking as someone who used to teach Russian at the FCO I find that particularly shocking. Does he really mean that there are no longer people in that hallowed institution who can speak and read Russian and/or Ukrainian?

Sir Tony Brenton KCMG is, incidentally,former British Ambassador to Russia and Fellow of Wolfson College, Cambridge, and Mr John Lough, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, and I should dearly love to know how good his Russian is or was but I may be biased as I do not think I ever taught him.

There is a deal of truth in the assumption that knowledge has disappeared but not totally. There have been many non-government institutions in the last few years whose analysts have produced useful papers, articles and even the odd book, which predicted various scenarios not too dissimilar from the one we are watching now. Why exactly were these papers etc not read by our boffins in the FCO or the EEAS?

We know that the BBC Russian Service has been eviscerated and that has deprived the country of much knowledge but also of the capacity to respond to Russian propaganda. Certainly, attention both in the FCO and the various security services veered away from Russia as another threat seemed more urgent though how anyone could think since the 2008 war in Georgia that Russia was not a problem on the international scene is beyond my capacity to understand.

What I want to look at is the myth because that is what it is, in my opinion, that in the past we had this astonishing network of people in academia, in the foreign and diplomatic service, in the media who really understood what was going on in the Soviet Union and the Communist countries, could predict certain scenarios and plan for them.

Sadly, this is not my recollection and when I point this out to those who complain about the present state of affairs, they often agree with me. What I remember is academics who, with very few exceptions, asserted that the difference between the Soviet system and a western-style democracy was one of degree rather than anything more fundamental. How many times did I read or hear the comment that people do turn up for various meetings and take part in them and that proves that there is a democratic process of a kind going on. These were people who held and continued to hold academic posts.

The FCO and its minions as well as the well paid academics failed to predict many things, starting with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (my father was one of the very few who insisted that the Soviet Union could not and would not allow the so-called Communism with a human face to survive) all the way to the collapse of the Soviet Union, though it was becoming ever more probable as things disintegrated under Gorbachev's attempts to reinvigorate the system.

I am pleased to say that a highly regarded witness would probably agree with me, as is clear from Paragraph 57, which then goes on to suggest that things have got worse:

Mr Klaus recalled that there had been a historic asymmetry, whereby former communist countries "knew the West much more than you knew the East", and that this asymmetry remained. His Excellency Dr Revaz Gachechiladze, Georgian Ambassador to the UK, also noted that there was "not a good understanding of Russia in the West". Turning to recent events, Mr Lukyanov recalled that on the day of the Crimean referendum, when the question had already been announced, he continued to receive disbelieving calls from European diplomats saying: "'It cannot happen. It is just a bluff'." He warned us that with "this level of analysis, I am afraid that more surprises are to come, and not only from Russia." Dr Casier agreed that there was a "huge need for more knowledge about the local situation both in Russia and in the Eastern Partnership countries." This was where "we have to build much stronger analytical capacity." Dr Casier pointed out that President Yanukovych's decision not to sign the Association Agreement (AA) "had been the subject of speculation in the Ukrainian press long before he announced his decision, but took the EU by total surprise."

While I am not sure about that asymmetry former President Klaus talks about (the Communist countries got many things wrong as well) I certainly recall the willful blindness of the West.

Randomly, I recall arguments with young ambitious academics who insisted that the way forward was to make friends with various Soviet representatives here, listen to them in a friendly fashion and use their statements as material. Some of these had been students of the great Professor Leonard Schapiro and were openly exultant in the fact that they took a very different stance and attitude from his. (The fact that he knew what he was talking about did not bother them - the man was a back number and his students, who took that very different route, were taking over.)

I recall a very public spat (in the columns of the Times Literary Supplement, no less) with a very eminent Oxford academic whose name, for the moment and with gritted teeth, I am going to keep quiet who was arguing that the Communist system under Gorbachev was evolving  into something resembling an open, democratic society. One of my several arguments against that was that the Soviet Union was the only one of the more or less developed countries that refused to allow hostile critics into the country. Not so, argued my opponent, they do sometimes refuse entry to people who might have family connections in the present or the past but otherwise they are very open.

Of course, people with family connections may well speak the language well and can find their way around the place and the system without any official help, which may be the reason why they were not allowed in, a problem that did not bother the eminent academic in the slightest. Nor did he seem perturbed by the fact that he could research and study only carefully vetted material.

One more recollection. During my time of teaching Russian in the FCO one of my tasks was to help people who had been seconded to the Cabinet Office but were about to be sent to the USSR to revive their knowledge of the language. Although this was taking place in 1990 - 1991 there was no suggestion that anyone in the FCO was thinking about the possibility that the Soviet Union would not last.

In February 1991, as some readers will recall, John Major visited the Soviet Union and had meetings with President Gorbachev, Lithuania President Landsbergis but not Yeltsin who had, by this time "elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), in spite of the fact that Gorbachev personally pleaded with the Russian deputies not to select Yeltsin". In effect he was the President of Russia and as the Soviet Union was on its last legs, he was going to head the largest and most important of the successor states.

Why, I asked one of my students, fresh from his stint with the Cabinet Office, in our Russian discussion of politics and related matters, did Mr Major not meet Boris Yeltsin? I was told that there had been a great deal of heart searching in the FCO and it was decided by all those highly intelligent and knowledgeable experts that it would be better if there was no official meeting between the two.

As I wrote in my obituary of President Yeltsin on my erstwhile blogging home:

In March 1989 Yeltsin was elected to the Soviet Parliament and in 1990 he became Chairman of the Russian Parliament, the Republic’s effective President, the first one to be elected.

You would think that by this stage it would have become clear to the experts in the West that the Soviet Union was probably doomed. Not so but far from it. While many of us, interested in the country, realized this, the solid cohort of Foreign Office experts and academic sovietologists continued to extol Gorbachev as the country’s hope. Yeltsin was apparently dismissed from too many calculations even though he obviously represented the future with Gorbachev unable to keep up with him.

I rest my case.

The report is correct in that the situation is now probably worse than it was during the Cold War as, it would appear, that the skills the FCO and other institutions look for have little to do with knowledge, learning or analytical skills. It is also true that for years, far longer than was justified, there has been an official view that Russia was not really a problem and even if it was not quite as friendly as we thought it would be, it was not really all that unfriendly though the evidence was mounting. What I find hard to accept is the view of some wonderful past situation when this was all completely different.

We lost the propaganda war

The title refers to the Cold War, on which I have been meditating recently, what with the death of Vaclav Havel and the release of the new, completely inadequate version of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. While militarily and politically the West won, in the more insiduous field of propaganda, it lost. We can see that in the neurotic anti-Americanism that makes people support some of the most oppressive regimes and ideologies in the world, in the continuing support for the once and future President, now Prime Minister Putin because he appears to be anti-Western, and, above all, in the refusal to face up to the truth about Communism. If you have any doubts about this, have a look at this interview the BBC conducted about the events of 2011 with their historian of choice: the life-long Communist and Stalinist (as long as it was the party line) and denial of Communist crimes, Eric Hobsbawm. I suggest you keep a sick-bucket somewhere close to hand.

Things I missed while trying to have a life

One piece of good news this week-end was the death of the Dear Leader of the Democratic People's Republic  of Korea, Kim Jong-il. Or, at least, it was announced this week-end that he died on Saturday. One can never tell with those People's Organizations or Republics. It's good news because he, truly, was evil. That word is bandied around a good deal but in this case and in the case of the rest of his friends and family, it is entirely accurate.

Of course, the horror of North Korea is not over; if the succession is peaceful the same will continue, if it is not, there will be a nasty civil war that may spill over into South Korea, where there is a distinct nervousness.

The sad news was the death of Vaclav Havel, who, to be fair, was more of a symbol and a talking head to be produced at many well-meaning international congresses, conferences and meetings. Still, he did remind us all of the heroic days of the dissident opposition to Communism.

There are so many obituaries of Havel around that I shall link to three only, one on the Cato site and two on ChicagoBoyz (here and here). Not unexpectedly, I shall try to eschew the sentimentality that surrounded the man and still continues. On the whole, he was more popular in the West than in his own land, despite the outpourings of emotion now, because the West saw the symbol and not the real politician who was far more controversial (as what politician is not).

To start with, he was a Central European intellectual, a form of animal life that is unknown in Britain or anywhere in the Anglosphere (and how lucky they all are). He was a playwright, who, even before 1968 wrote plays that were a somewhat daring departure from the required socialist realism. Neither those plays nor the later dissident ones about Ferdinand Vanek were particularly good. I saw several, so I can attest that abandoning the theatre and going on to the political stage was a very good decision to take.

Havel, I have always felt, would have been very happy with Communism with a Human Face, an impossible notion that was supposedly Alexander Dubcek's aim in 1968. The Soviets rightly decided that, left to itself, it would mean the dissolution of Communism, leaving it with no face at all, and put the Prague Spring down quite brutally but not as badly as some other rebellions. The country was plunged into gloom with most people averting their eyes from the public sphere.

There were a few exceptions, the signatories of  Charter 77, various other dissidents, the rock group Plastic Peoples of the Universe and so on. As these people were deprived of their jobs in universities, research institutes, theatres, schools, and other suchlike institutions, they had to become workers in factories, window cleaners, truck drivers and, sometimes, worse. This is what Havel wrote about in the Vanek plays.

Gradually, his name became synonymous with the low-key stubborn opposition to Communism in Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia and it was not surprising that during the Velvet Revolution, the demonstrators demanded that he should be in the Castle, that is become President. He was not so much the leader of the Velvet Revolution as its single public face.

Subsequent events proved that a man who made the perfect dissident was not necessarily a good politician. Indeed, many post-Communist societies found that. Havel, despite himself, presided over the inevitable split of the country's two parts, resigned because of it but was re-elected as President of the Czech Republic. There were, inevitably, various problems and a few scandals of political and financial nature. All this will have been detailed in the various obituaries.

In the late nineties we nearly said good-bye to Havel as he was diagnosed, twice, with lung cancer. But he survived and, given the length of time, was, presumably, cured. His wife, Olga, did die of cancer and he swiftly married again to a few raised eyebrows but then there had always been rumours about his private life. Of no real importance to a true Central European intellectual.

After his presidency, Havel travelled, wrote, spoke and, generally, became one of the great members of the international political intelligentsia, slightly left of centre as he would happily admit, very much in favour of various well-meaning transnational organizations. His intellect did not have the hard-edged ruthlessness of his great rival, Vaclav Klaus.

His death brings sadness. He was, in most ways, honourable and courageous; a man who who perceived the evil of Communism and was not afraid to fight it; a symbol of that struggle. Requiescat in pace.

ADDENDUM: It has been pointed out to me that there is a serious gap in my description of Havel's activity after he was President. He, unlike most of the Europeans he was associating with, opposed the bloody and oppressive Cuban regime without any caveats. Of course, he understood it better.

Nothing in history is for ever

Or in other words, hysterical weeping and gnashing of teeth is of very little use to those of us who would like to reverse the situation or move to another level of historical development. Nothing is for ever; nothing is over not to be retrieved.

Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Berlin Wall. Here is the beginning:

And here are two pictures from the end, twenty years ago, today. Think about it and start drawing some conclusions.

And another thing ...

It seems that I shall not be able to avoid posting something about the death and life of Senator Edward Kennedy. One thing we must say immediately: this is really the end of the long-ago tarnished Kennedy myth. The next generation and the one after it have shown that they have inherited all the Kennedy failings without any of the abilities, which were concentrated in old Joe (though he tended to misuse them), JFK and RFK. The oldest brother, Joseph, was killed in the war before anybody could find out much about him.

It is easy to get sentimental about the Kennedys as one recalls the good looking brothers who were going to change so many things in politics. And they did. Between them the Kennedys managed to introduce a good deal of poison into American politics, what with old Joe making pro-Nazi noises when ambassador to the UK before the war; the problems with the 1960 election, the money that changed hands and the votes that disappeared; and subsequent shenanigans. Two assassinations, both from the left of the political spectrum, do not alter those facts.

Ted Kennedy was the best looking and the least talented of the three brothers. We are talking about a man who was thrown out of Harvard for cheating. Then again, Jack did not actually write "Profiles in Courage" and the Pulitzer Prize was awarded after old Joe injected some cash into the situation.

The BBC, I understand, has mentioned that Ted Kennedy has never recovered from Chappaquiddick. I can only echo somebody else's comment that neither did Mary Jo Kopechne nor, I assume, her family.

Plenty of other people will rehash that story as well as Kennedy's support for the murderous IRA and his tendency to interfere in British affairs in order to show that support. American blogs will have much on his attempts to fiddle the succession in the Senate, his fervent support for Obamacare as long as it did not affect Congresscritters, i.e. him, and his equally fervent opposition to educational vouchers in Washington DC. He was for the poor as long as the poor did not get too uppity.

So what can I add that is of any interest? As it happens there is something that is known among some but not too many: Kennedy's links with Mikhail Gorbachev that went beyond his much trumpeted visit to the Soviet Union in 1986.

The programme with Dan Rather (yes, him again) referred to Senator Kennedy's somewhat perfunctory mention of the great Andrei Sakharov and, no doubt, to the American politician's statesman-like attempts to create a "real" detente unlike the one pushed by that "cowboy" President Reagan. In fact, Kennedy had no particular standing in international negotiations and, undoubtedly, Gorbachev and his advisers would have realized that.

There was a good deal more to Senator Kennedy's relationship with President Gorbachev as described in this article in the National Review by two people who had gone through the published and unpublished literature, Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov.

What the article tells of is a series of actions on the part of the Senator, which had been co-ordinated with various of Gorbachev's advisers if not with the man himself, such as his attack on President Carter for his tough stance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (It has come to something that one finds oneself supporting Carter but he was in the right there.)

More secrets about Kennedy’s collaboration with Moscow became known after the famous defector Vasiliy Mitrokhin smuggled his invaluable archive of secret KGB documents to the West. In 2002, he publicized some of them in The KGB in Afghanistan working paper, published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. In 1980 Kennedy attacked President Carter over the latter’s tough opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As Mitrokhin reveals, the senator had evidently coordinated that with Moscow several weeks before — through Tunney and Egon Bahr, West Germany’s top Social Democrat who often had secret contacts with the KGB.

The really interesting aspect of this curious friendship (between Kennedy and Gorbachev) is related in a report by Vadim Zagladin, then No. 2 in the International Department of the Soviet Communist party, who also met Kennedy during the 1986 visit.

During the talks, which took place […] on the 5th of February [1986], E.Kennedy emphasized the following ideas.

1. The recent meeting [between Gorbachev and President Reagan in Geneva] has changed the climate in the world in many respects. This may be felt strongly in the USA. The change is for the better, the birth of hopes for a better future. However, this process also has a negative side. President Reagan actively uses the new climate. And the problem is not only that his popularity
is growing after Geneva.

In fact, Geneva allowed Reagan to slow down the process of movement to any positive results in negotiations with the USSR. He says that the situation has already changed, that he has instituted a dialogue with the Russians, while in fact he does nothing or manages things in the old direction, i. e. that of increasing military preparations.

From the Democrats’ point of view, all of this is very bad. This does not mean they are against Geneva or the spirit of Geneva – they are for it. But they think it is important not to allow Reagan to abuse a good thing for bad purposes.

[…]

In his opinion, it is important to keep increasing pressure on the administration from different sides, both from abroad and at home. He would like, during his conversation with Com[rade] Gorbachev to suggest some specific ideas on this issue.

It is unfortunate that we don’t have the full transcript of those talks between Kennedy and Gorbachev. Later documents indicate, however, that at the meeting the senator suggested that the timing for the next Soviet-American summit should be set as soon as possible. This, Kennedy claimed, would enable more pressure to be put on the administration. If Reagan declined to discuss any serious issues at the summit, this fact could be used against him as well “to
the benefit of the supporters of peace and of the establishment of more realistic relations between our countries.” Those are the words Gorbachev used to relay Kennedy’s ideas to Guss Hall, general secretary of the U.S. Communist party.

After talking to Gorbachev on February 6, Kennedy came back to Zagladin who reported:

In the evening of the 6th of February (over a supper) I had a conversation with E. Kennedy.

1) The Senator is under strong impression from his talk with C[omrade] M.S. Gorbachev. ‘‘I liked him very much’’, Kennedy said. ‘‘He is a firm, though flexible, leader, who knows what he wants’’. […]

2) At the same time, in E. Kennedy’s opinion, ‘‘my Soviet friends have not yet thoroughly understood the psychology of the Americans and the essence of Reagan’s tactics’’.

Geneva was a great victor for the Soviet Union in the eyes of the whole world, but not in the eyes of the Americans. The average American sees the situation as follows: ‘‘Reagan has managed to establish contact with the Russians, gaining much from them, but giving nothing. He is a great leader!’’.

[…]

The Senator’s speculations seemed to suggest that Geneva was a real success for Reagan and a doubtful one for us. So, I asked him a direct question: well, do you think it was a mistake to go to Geneva? The Senator replied without hesitation: ‘‘No, it was not, but you should keep pressing, be firmer.’’

[…]

Kennedy’s impression is that we are awaiting the USA’s reaction calmly because we suppose that time is working for us. In his opinion, however, this is not quite right. So far Reagan is winning. He seems to be ‘‘thinking over’’ our ideas, but he keeps pursuing his own policy — building up the arms race. He will then respond later, taking some item from the full context of the Soviet offers,
but in such a way that it will be difficult to agree with him. For example, arms control without disarmament, etc.

Meanwhile, Reagan’s popularity is growing.

There is a good deal more on that visit and Senator Kennedy's subsequent dealings with President Gorbachev when President Reagan was succeeded by Bush Senior and the Soviet Union began to show the cracks that subsequently blew it apart.

It is a long article but worth reading in full. What emerges is a picture of an American politician who, for his own gain and for his party's success, is ready to negotiate with the leader of the country's main enemy. Not pretty but in character.