More anniversaries

August does tend to be the month of rather grisly anniversaries. I mentioned the twenty-fifth of the attempted Soviet coup but there are others in the last week or so.

First of all, let us not forget that today is St Bartholomew's Day, or the massacre of 1572 that began the night before it and lasted several days in Paris and several weeks in the rest of the country. One interesting detail is that the English ambassador to Paris at the time was Francis Walsingham, who not only witnessed the horrors but gave sanctuary to as many as he could of the Huguenots. His then pregnant wife escaped with their daughter. Walsingham had already been in favour of helping Dutch and French Protestants but his experience in August 1572 defined his subsequent attitudes and policies.

 .Moving to the twentieth century (which had many things in common with the sixteenth and the seventeenth though the numbers of victims were considerably higher), we have the anniversary of the suppression of the Prague Spring with the Warsaw Pact tanks moving into the country on the night of August 20 to 21, 1968.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939 (while the Soviet Union was still negotiating with France and Britain). That, too, is a state secret in Russia and  you can get into trouble if you write about it.

Today is also the twenty-firth anniversary of Ukrainian independence and a happy time it is, too, what with Crimea in Russian hands, Eastern Ukraine in endless turmoil created by Russia and its henchmen plus continuing threats and destabilization of the rest of the country by Big Brother in the east.

Another curious anniversary is also to do with Russia and her attitude to her neighbours and their sovereignty. On August 25, 2008 Russia, some weeks after invading Georgia, "recognized" the independence of two break-away regions that had been virtually controlled by them even before the invasion, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The two remain in limbo internationally speaking but de facto part of Russia domestically. It was, however, an important precedent.

Happy rest of August to all as we come up to the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

Rejoice but do not forget

Two good news items today: the release of Nadiya Savchenko and of the investigative Azerbaijani journalist Khadija Ismajilova. Of the two, oddly enough, straightforward rejoicing is in order more with the latter.

Khadija Ismayilova was released on probation by the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan on appeal after a world-wide campaign. (An addition source of satisfaction is that this was not achieved by the egregious Amal Clooney who was taking the case to the ECHR.)

Ismayilova, who had delved into the wealth of the country’s first family, was arrested in December 2014 and sentenced to seven-and-a-half years in jail in September last year.

The supreme court ruled on Wednesday that her sentence would be changed to a three-and-a-half-year suspended term. A group of wellwishers gathered outside the court with balloons to celebrate the verdict, which has come two days before Ismayilova’s 40th birthday. She is expected to leave detention later in the day.

Her trial, on charges of tax evasion and embezzlement, was widely seen as politically motivated, and revenge for her award-winning reporting. In her work for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), she carried out a number of investigations that linked president Ilham Aliyev and his family to alleged corruption scandals.

At the same time as Ismayilova’s arrest, Azerbaijan’s authorities also raided RFE/RL’s Baku bureau and sealed it shut. The oil-rich country is run by Aliyev, who took over when his father died in 2003, and little dissent is tolerated. A number of other rights activists, journalists and lawyers have been imprisoned in the country on charges widely decried as politicised, though a group of them were released earlier this year.

Either the Supreme Court in Azerbaijan is more independent than any of us had believed or, much more likely, the Aliyev family is relatively sensitive to Western reactions and attitudes.

One cannot say the same about Vlad and his Chekists who are about as sensitive as a rhinoceros is to tickling (don't try it at home).

Nadiya Savchenko, Russia's most famous hostage, as RFE/RL says, was also released today, having been pardoned by President Putin after fairly long imprisonment, stretches of hunger strike, a show trial overwhelming in its ludicrousness and a twenty-two year sentence. She is not simply being released, though, but exchanged for two Russians, Yevgeny Yerofeyev and Alexander Alexandrov, who had been described during their trial in Ukraine as being

elite members of Russian military intelligence - but Russia insisted they were not on active duty when they were captured in eastern Ukraine.

They were sentenced to 14 years in jail last month after being found guilty of waging an "aggressive war" against Ukraine, committing a terrorist act and using weapons to provoke an armed conflict.

They, too, have been pardoned by President Poroshenko.

So Savchenko's release is a little more complicated than Ismayilova's conditional one. As Brian Whitmore says on The Morning Vertical

And as for Russia, Savchenko was just the most high-profile example of Moscow's recent habit of hostage-taking: of snatching foreign citizens from their homelands and forcing them to endure ridiculous show trials in Russia. That list runs from Estonian law-enforcement officer Eston Kohver, who has been released, to Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov, who has not. For those released, the pattern is similar: the abduction, the transparently absurd charges and cover story, the show trial, and finally the exchange for Russians who have committed actual crimes.

Expect more of the same in the near future.

Circling round the subject

There seems to be far too much ink (metaphorically speaking) spilled on matters to do with the Brexit referendum but occasionally there might be something to add even by this blog. For example, there is the question of what is to be done (as both Chernyshevsky and Lenin asked in their day) with the leaflet so thoughtfully sent out by HMG to every household in which the said households were being chided to do the right thing and vote to remain in the European Union.

It so happens that I was discussing that very point with a friend on the phone when the postman hove into view and delivered my copy of it. I suppose before I do anything I ought to have a look at it but, somehow, the mood is not upon me. 

Is this actually legal I ask. After all, MPs and Councillors are not allowed to use official facilities to conduct election campaigns and HMG is not allowed to send out leaflets telling the benighted voters to vote for them because they are so wonderful though, clearly, a government in place has certain advantages over the opposition in matters electoral. Why are they allowed to use official facilities and, thus, taxpayers' money to tell us which way to vote in a referendum? 

Anyway, everything has been said on that subject as well so the only question that remains is what is one to do with this document. I am afraid the paper is a little too shiny for my cats' litter tray (they don't like it); Nigel Farage's advice, as usual, is of no use as it is not in an envelope and, therefore, cannot simply be returned to sender; I have no desire to spend money on the postage. 

I could put it in an envelope, address it the Rt Hon. David Cameron, 10, Downing Street etc and put no stamps on it or stamps that add up to some minimal tiny amount, thus forcing the flunkeys to pay for the postage. If a few hundred thousand of us did it, there would be a great deal of dissatisfaction in Number 10. Or, perhaps, one of the organizations, say Vote Leave or Grassroots Out (GO), could issue a call to collect as many of these leaflets as possible and then deliver them to the gates of Downing Street in a van or lorry. I have not heard of such an initiative so I have to make some kind of a decision myself. 

Meanwhile, we have had a great deal of excitement about the Dutch Referendum that rejected the Ukraine-European Union treaty and the highly predictable fact that the EU is going to ignore it. To be fair, it is hard to see what the EU can do about this. Even as far as the Dutch government is concerned a referendum in that country is advisory but it would be a foolish Dutch politician who ignored it. As far as the EU is concerned 32 per cent of the Dutch electorate is not of any real importance. Nor is it of importance from a democratic point of view. They are a tiny minority of the EU's population and even 64 per cent of that tiny minority does not amount to much. Exactly whom do they represent? Slightly more people than the Eurocrats do but not by much. One cannot have a referendum about something those who are asked are not in control of.

All this shows the dangers of direct as opposed to representative democracy. Those who whine about "not being represented" by our elected representatives had better consider the possibilities of major decisions being taken in the wake of completely unrepresentative direct plebiscites. 

Of course, it is unpleasant to have any section of the people saying NO to whatever they are told is good for them. Does this show growing euroscepticism in Holland or a general fed-upness with yet more migrants from Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the figures tell you nothing. But it is worth noting that 68 per cent may not have turned out to vote against the agreement but neither did they turn out to vote for it. So, perhaps, dissatisfaction is genuinely growing. 

"Land of rulers, land of slaves"

In 1840 Mikhail Lermontov, one of Russia's greatest poets and an army officer, was exiled, after a duel, to the Caucasus where Russia, as is her wont, was fighting a prolonged war against the Chechens and the Dagestani. This was his second exile from St Petersburg, the first being in 1837 after he had written a brilliant and vitriolic poem about Alexander Pushkin's death in a duel.

On his way to the Caucasus Lermontov wrote:

Прощай немытая Россия,
Страна рабов, страна господ,
И вы, мундиры голубые,
И ты, послушный им народ.

My slightly hasty translation of the quatrain is this:

Farewell to you, unwashed Russia,
Land of rulers, land of slaves,
Farewell to you blue uniforms,
And to you, submissive people.

It is hard not to think of those lines as one reads and watches the news from Russia.

August 25 is the anniversary of the protest in the Red Square when, in 1968, just four days after the Soviet tanks had rolled into Prague to put an end to "Communism with a human face" (frankly a silly idea but, as Brezhnev realized, other things might grow out of it), eight people came out to demonstrate their disgust with the action of their government. They carried placards with the old slogan: За Вашу и Нашу Свободу, For Your Freedom and Ours.

They and their comrades paid a heavy price for their stance and their names, Larisa Bogoraz, Konstantin Babitsky, Tatyana Bayeva, Vadim Delaunay, Vladimir Dremlyuga, Viktor Fainberg, Natalya Gorbanevskaya, and Pavel Litvinov, ought to be better known than they are.

Well, time has gone on, the Soviet Union is no more, and the news that came from Russia yesterday on the anniversary of this event was that the illegally arrested Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov and his co-defendant Oleksandr  Kolchenko were sentenced to twenty years and ten years hard labour in strict regime camps for alleged terrorist plotting for which there is no evidence. It is true that they have both criticized the Russian occupation of Ukraine and in the feverish imagination of the Russian authorities that is equivalent to terrorist activity. In fact, judging by the sentence it is even worse.

It seems that the people of Russia have decided not to pay attention to any of these problems and, to be fair, there is now a safety valve for many: if they wish and can raise the money they can leave for the West, something that was not open to them in 1968. Later on, of course, dissidents were either pushed out of strongly advised to leave.

Does anyone still stand up for their freedom and others' in Russia itself? Certainly. We hear about some and we know that these have often ended badly or, at the very least, have had a bad time. As long as they are only individuals the authorities can pick them off; with mass demonstrations they tend to stand back and restrain themselves.

Thanks to Radio Liberty we now have a list of another eight people, so far less well known in the West than Navalny, Politkovskaya, Khodorkovsky, Nemtsov and the Pussy Riot girls, who have dared to say what they thought of the regime, regardless of personal consequences. So far they have had difficulties but are still alive and reasonably well. But, as in the days of the Soviet Union and the dissidents they need to be watched.

More about that common foreign policy

One of the most remarkable aspects of the entire Russian/Ukrainian/anyone else who is on the Russian border crisis has been the irrelevance of the EU as an entity. Undoubtedly that is why there are these strenuous efforts being made on both sides of the argument to talk up its role either as the initiator of one particular stage of the crisis (is that hysterical laughter I hear from the Kremlin?) or as the obvious solution to it (and that is definitely the sound of bemused silence).

So, assuming that for once the EU has some kind of an idea of what its policy is (a tall assumption) do we actually have countries falling into line with it? Well, no, since you ask, we don't.

There is the bizarre behaviour of the  Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who is playing some kind of a convoluted game with Russia, the rest of the EU and his own people, relying, on assumes on that well-known Hungarian ability to come out ahead in a revolving door even if one went in behind someone. This may be a heresy but I have to admit that I am not sure that always works.

Then there is Greece that every now and then threatens to subvert the sanctions on the grounds that they do not like what the EU is doing to a fellow Orthodox country or because the Germans owe them reparations or because they are just feeling bloody-minded. None of these threats have actually come to anything yet.

Italy is making unhappy noises and, in connection with that let me point to an interesting piece of information in the recent House of Lords Report on the EU and Russia (ch. 2 para. 19):

The exposure of UK banks to Russia is fairly low at $14.2 billion, below that of France ($47.7 billion), Italy ($27.7 billion) and Germany ($17.7 billion), all of which have much smaller banking sectors.

Though there has been "a marked decrease in the exposure of European banks to Russia between the third quarter of 2013 and the second quarter of 2014", these are worrying figures for France and Italy.

We also have a problem with Cyprus. This was discussed in the House of Lords on March 10 when Lord Sharkey asked HMG

what discussions they have had with the Governments of the Republic of Cyprus and other European Union member states about the proposal to establish a Russian military base on Cyprus.

Well, indeed. An interesting problem in view of the EU trying to keep all its little soldiers in one box. Could it be that the member states do not think their interests are quite unanimous?

Baroness Anelay of St Johns replied:

My Lords, we have been and remain in regular discussion with the Republic of Cyprus about security and defence matters, and have been briefed on the agreement signed in Moscow. The Cypriot Government have assured us that these agreements represent a continuation of existing arrangements. We continually stress to our EU partners the need for EU unity in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Lord Sharkey's follow-up question was a little more pointed though, as a matter of courtesy, he ought to have thanked the Minister for her reply:

The fact is that, in return for debt relief, Cyprus has formalised an agreement to let Russian warships use its ports. There is also talk of use of an airbase at Paphos, which is 40 miles from our base at Akrotiri. President Putin has said that this deal should not cause any worries anywhere. Does the Minister agree with President Putin or does she agree with the United States State Department’s comment on the Cyprus deal that now is not the time to be doing business as normal with Russia?

Not quite, said the Minister:

My Lords, I have made it clear in this House before that it cannot be business as usual with Russia while it maintains its position over Ukraine, where it has illegally annexed the Crimea and intervened in another state’s sovereign lands. My noble friend refers to a situation in the Republic of Cyprus that I do not recognise. When speaking to Russian media, President Anastasiades explicitly ruled out the use of Limassol port for military purposes. Foreign Minister Kasoulides also said to the press, after the February EU Foreign Affairs Committee meeting in Brussels, that there was no question of Russian air or naval military bases on the soil of Cyprus. It is a continuation of existing agreements.

Subsequent comments referred to other countries that are falling out of line with no solution to the problem being proposed.

And here we are again

This week-end saw a wave of protests in Russia against the war with Ukraine and some support for them in the West. I shall blog about it in due course and about the fact that President Putin with his Chekists seem unexpectedly nervous. I am not sure that the news of him signing a "decree restoring the title "Dzerzhinsky Division" to an elite police unit that was previously named after the founder of the Bolshevik secret police" is a sign of defiance or just whistling in the dark. Interesting, nonetheless, but hardly surprising. Perhaps, he, a mid-ranking KGB/FSB officer would like to see himself as a latter day version of Iron Felix.

Meanwhile, President Obama has announced new airstrikes against the "Islamic State" in Syria and the war in the Middle East that he was going to end successfully as it had been entirely President Bush's fault is spiralling out of anybody's control.

Also meanwhile, and unsurprisingly given the situation in eastern Europe, Poland is buying missiles from the US. I have no doubt our Nige will be wagging his finger at them any minute now and telling them that they should stop annoying the Bear. Or some such foolishness.

The news from Ukraine is a little unclear

The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament (yes, dear readers, it was elected) has passed two pieces of legislation, as EUObserver reports.

Firstly

Ukraine has granted semi-autonomy and amnesty to pro-Russia rebels, the same day as ratifying a strategic EU treaty.

Its parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, passed the rebel laws in a closed session on Tuesday (16 September) by 277 and 287 votes out of 450, respectively, a pro-Western MP, Andriy Shevchenko, said on Twitter.

They give the separatist strongholds in Donetsk and Luhansk, east Ukraine, limited self-rule, or “special status”, for the next three years.

The rebels will be allowed to create their own police forces and to build closer relations with Russian regions, with local elections in December to lend weight to the separatist leaders.

This has caused a certain amount of discontent among some MPs. As Yuliya Tymoshenko, whose party voted against the laws said, they "legalize terrorism and the occupation of Ukraine". Then again, the reality of the situation is that, no matter what we hear from the Russian media and the people who get their information from it, there are something like 3,000 Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. This is not enough to invade the rest of the country or, even, establish Russian rule in the east but it is enough to prevent Ukraine from re-establishing its rule there.

Radio Free Europe covers much the same ground though it prefers to concentrate on the fact that it is the rebels who hold the territory in dispute. As we have seen in the last few months, the rebels were defeated by the Ukrainian army but something happened to push them back. One wonders whether that something is related to the appearance of body bags in Russian towns where families had not been informed where their sons had been sent to fight. (More of that in another posting.)

The Verkhovna Rada on September 16 passed a law giving parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions broader autonomy for a three-year period, seeking to end a deadly conflict with pro-Russian separatists and keep the country of 45 million in one piece.

The law allows local authorities to set up their own police forces and name judges and prosecutors. It provides for snap elections on December 7 to establish new councils in certain districts of the region known broadly as the Donbas.

The broad-ranging political legislation also guarantees the right for Russian to be spoken in state institutions, and allows local authorities to strengthen relations with neighboring regions of Russia.

It promises to help restore damaged infrastructure and to provide social and economic assistance to areas particularly hard-hit by the conflict, which has killed more than 3,000 people since April.

A separate law passed in the same closed-door hearing grants amnesty to participants in the conflict between pro-Russian separatists and government forces, excluding those who have committed "serious crimes."

Secondly, the Verkhovna Rada as well as the Toy Parliament ratified the EU-Ukraine Trade Accord, as both news stories make clear. However, let us not forget that it is not a particularly meaningful ratification as the two sides have already agreed to postpone its implementation for another year. (That I have already blogged about.)

Moving on to another post-Soviet state, we have some worrying reports from Moldova (worrying but not surprising for those of us who have followed what President Putin is up to). Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor is the best source of news about that whole area and its daily e-mails, which are a long way ahead of the blog itself, are to be recommended to anyone who really wants to know what is going on.

This was one of the items in yesterday's e-mail:

Chisinau Says Pro-Moscow Provocations Ahead

Mihai Balan, director of Moldova’s Intelligence and Security Service (SIS), says the organization has evidence that Moscow is planning to stage provocations in his country in the coming weeks, in advance of the Moldovan November parliamentary elections. Russia will utilize not only traditional sources of Transnistria in the north and Gagauzia in the southeast, he argues, but Moscow also intends to put in play “hundreds of NGOs [non-governmental organizations]” and political parties that receive financing and direction from the Russian government. The goals of these actions, he says, are to sow confusion and split Moldova apart (inforesist.org, September 10).

According to Balan, “the country’s leadership is receiving information in a timely fashion about the situation in the country and in the region.” But he said that “citizens, too, must be vigilant and not fall victim to provocations by those forces that do not wish good for our country. Unfortunately, the number of such provocateurs is greater than those who love the Republic of Moldova.” Nonetheless, he pledged that “if not today, then tomorrow, those responsible will answer before the law.”

To counter this growing threat, Balan said that Chisinau has stepped up control measures concerning visitors to Moldova, “in the first instance at the Chisinau airport,” in the hopes of blocking an influx of activists who might be used to stir up trouble. Some suspicious individuals have already been detained and then sent back to their country of origin, the security services chief noted.

Three things about Balan’s statement are significant. First, while he said that Transnistria and Gagauzia remain problems, his remarks suggest that Chisinau is now more worried about groups within the Moldovan population that Moscow is organizing to challenge the existing regime. Almost all Western analysis has focused on one or the other of these neuralgic problems rather than on divisions real or promoted by Moscow within Moldovan society. Balan’s comments suggest that it is time to refocus attention there, while not neglecting the ways in which Moscow can exploit either Tiraspol or Komrat.

Second, his remarks call attention to a calendar that few outside Moldova have appeared to pay attention to: the approaching parliamentary campaign in which ethnic tensions are likely to run high in any case. If Moscow is focusing on this, then the probability that it will organize provocations in Moldova will increase with each passing week before the vote. Electoral campaigns are typically the time when emotions are most raw and when demagogues can play on them to destabilize the situation. Putin has been particularly sensitive in his planning to the timing of his actions, and it is almost certain that the Kremlin—even if not the West—is focusing on this calendar.

And third, Balan’s tone was distinctly pessimistic, suggesting that he and others in the Moldovan government are worried that such provocations may have their intended effect; typically, government officials and especially those in the security agencies exude confidence. Granted, it is of course possible that the security chief is seeking more funding for the SIS and increased support of other kinds by playing up a conflict that few have paid attention to up to now and one that, within Moldova, only his organization is ready to deal with.

That emotions and even fears of such Russian actions in Moldova are running high is suggested by the statements of several other Moldovan leaders. In particular, Mihai Gimpu, the leader of the Liberal Party of Moldova, which favors ending that country’s neutrality and pursuing membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), says he fears that “first Russia will swallow Ukraine and then eat us for dessert.” He continued, “We are a small country of three million residents and with a weak economy that rests on tomatoes and carrots. Would we be able to survive if Putin goes further? Of course, not” (regnum.ru, September 5).

The concerns Bilan has expressed and the emotional tone of Gimpu’s remarks mean that there is almost certainly going to be trouble ahead in Moldova. That danger is something Western officials must take into consideration, not only with respect to Moldova, but also in their planning for Ukraine. If the situation in Ukraine deteriorates or even continues at its current level, there will be an increasingly serious chance that Moscow will make a move in Moldova, which, in turn, could additionally destabilize Romania and, indeed, a good portion of the Balkans. And to the extent a scenario like this occurs, Hungary almost certainly would become involved as well—a reminder that once again, as a century ago, some small thing in the Balkans could trigger a much bigger conflagration for Europe and the world.

I must admit that given several possible scenarios, Eurasia Daily Monitor tends to take the most pessimistic one but that is no bad thing in the circumstances. One needs to prepare for the worst and hope for the best.

Undoubtedly, if things go badly wrong with Moldova we shall get the usual suspects to whom we can now add a large number of eurosceptics and the leadership (at least) of UKIP telling us to leave that nice Mr Putin alone and, anyway, it is all the West's fault.

What a difference a day makes

Alas no, I am not writing about the opinion polls on the Scottish referendum, which have been yo-yoing quite alarmingly, thus giving the opportunity every two-bit politician, activist and media hack to pontificate. No, this is about another messy situation that may not be more important in the long run (who can predict such things?) but is of greater immediate interest and worry to all except the dedicated appeasers of Russia, of whom there are too many both on the left and the right. For a while it looked like the trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which intensified Russia's efforts to destabilize Ukraine, will, after all, come into existence. (With all its faults it was never going to be a substitute for close relations between Russia and Ukraine as that would have been impossible. Russian actions in grabbing Crimea and fighting a war in eastern Ukraine have ensured Ukrainian hatred for the idea of a close Russian agreement. Given President Putin's preference for the sledgehammer as a method of diplomacy there seems to be no solution to the mess that has been thus created.) On September 12 it was announced that

Ukraine leader Petro Porosenko has said the European Parliament and the Ukrainian assembly, the Verkhovna Rada, will on 16 September jointly ratify the EU-Ukraine free trade pact. Ukraine's foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin will also meet with EU and Russian delegates in Brussels on Friday to discuss implementation of the treaty.

Come September 13 (that, is today) and the story has changed somewhat.

Ukraine and the EU are to delay the entry into life of a landmark free trade treaty for more than one year due to Russian concerns.

The trade pact was originally to enter into force on 1 November.

But following meetings between European Commission trade chief Karl De Gucht, Ukraine’s foreign minister, and Russia’s economy minister in Brussels on Friday (12 September) it will now be implemented on 31 December 2015.

Defending the deal, De Gucht told press it means Russia will not impose trade restrictions on Ukraine in the next 15 months.

One does not have to read between the lines or indulge in the arcane pseudo-science of Kremlinology (how that word takes me back to my youth!) to understand what happened: they all met on Friday (that's yesterday) and the Russians once again threatened to impose trade sanctions on Ukraine that would undermine its fragile economy just as its .... ahem .... aid convoys to eastern Ukraine are anxious to destroy its fragile political structure. Upon which, the EU capitulated. This will, no doubt, be greeted with joy among the appeasers in the various eurosceptic circles.

Judging by the EUObserver summary there seems to be some confusion around the EU decision with, quite possibly, a break-down in communication between the various offices that are supposedly negotiating and making decisions, such as they are.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the Kremlin (where are those Kremlinologists when one needs them?) has announced [in Russian but Mr Google will translate] that although there has been a big price rise in Russia on basic foodstuffs this had nothing to do with the counter-sanctions against Western imports. These price rises were happening, anyway, said Andrey Belousov, one of President Putin's assistants. He also explained that the sanctions imposed on Western imports were not really counter-sanctions, anyway, but were motivated by concern for the Russian consumers' health and, sometimes, for Russian products, though it is not quite clear which of the sanctions were motivated by which concerns. At least, neither he nor the others in President Putin's staff will go short of wine, no matter what sanctions or counter-sanctions Russia might decide to impose.

A modest proposal to businessmen with eyes on Russia and Ukraine

To be accurate, what I intend to write is not even a proposal, more of a suggestion, brought about by my continuing astonishment at the naiveté or stupidity or hopefulness beyond experience of businessmen who still think that they can go into Russia or Ukraine (until recently), buy property, set up a business or open a branch of existing one and get away with it, perhaps to make profits. How many cases of people being bullied, cheated, robbed, reduced to a nervous break-down and having their Russian employees murdered must we witness before people abandon all hope?

Now, don't get me wrong: I do not consider those businessmen to be motivated by charitable impulses. Not only do I not think that they are, I do not think that they should be and I would not trust them if they were, NGOs and large charities not being among my favourite organizations. 

Nor do I think those Western businessmen are particularly honest or honourable themselves and I came across a number of people who saw a chance in the collapse of the Soviet Union for a quick buck or a thousand in the chaos that was around them. But, surely, they have realized by now that the state and its minions in those countries, Vlad and his Chekists as well as Yanukovich and his "family" until recently are more corrupt, more brazen, less scrupulous and can command more power of different kinds than any Western business. 

Curiously enough, the problem of bullying, violent expropriation and nullification or subversion of contracts is greater in Russia and Ukraine than in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics not because these are not corrupt or oppressive but because, as the evidence seems to show, their officials, once bought, stay bought. Not so with the "European" parts of the former Soviet Union (excluding the Baltic states, always an anomaly) who have always been rather contemptuous of their Caucasian and Central Asian brothers and comrades. Perhaps, they should rethink that attitude. 

These thoughts were passing through my head as I was reading Oliver Bullough's recent report, published by Legatum Institute and Institute of Modern Russia, entitled Looting Ukraine: How East and West Teamed up to Steal a Country. 

I shall write in greater detail about the report, its somewhat emotional title and the presentation of it I went to. In this posting I want to concentrate on one tiny example Mr Bullough cites. Discussing how corruption worked under then President Yanukovich he explains that towards the end "property rights became so loose, and rule of law so weak, that state officials and insiders began, simply, to seize businesses", giving Yanukovich a hefty share of the profits. 

A certain British businessman, here named Bernard Carr, lost an office building to "competitors" who gained access to the land registry. This is his account:

It's basically about who pays the police more. The problem was that the police were being paid by both sides. We were paying the police and so was he. So we went to court and tried to buy our way through the court. The lawyers said if we paid 6,000 euros we would win, but you can't guarantee the other guy won't pay 7,000 euros. And you don't get a refund if you lose, which we did ... I have lost count of the number of times I've been told that if I pay someone a couple of grand a problem would go away, but then not have it go away.

I do not expect anyone to feel particularly sorry for Mr "Carr" or be sympathetic to his plight. It did, however, led me to that suggestion. It is that every businessman who thinks that he can do business in Russia and Ukraine and all he has to do is shell out a few appropriate bribes ought to have the following two lines inscribed on the wall of his office and, perhaps, as a screen-saver on his laptop:

That if once you have paid him the Danegeld,    
You never get rid of the Dane.

Probably too early for analysis

Why have I not commented on the shooting down (I think we can be certain about that) of the Malaysian airliner MH17? Have I missed the news or something? Well, no, I have not missed the news and have been following it to the best of my ability. It's just that I don't think there is much to say until we have a little more evidence. We do have some, of course, and that tells us that the likelihood is that it was shot down by Russian troops in eastern Ukraine who have been masquerading more or less successfully as separatists. That is the likelihood but there is no certainty.

This intercepted conversation points to some separatist group using Russian arms, stupidly given to them, to shoot down what they thought was a military aircraft, then going slightly wonky when they had to report their sheer idiocy to the superior Russian officer. It is fair to say that the phone call was released by the Ukrainian government yesterday and, so far as I can establish, has not been verified independently.

The separatists have now announced that they will allow investigator to visit the site of the crash, which is a remarkably generous action on their part. (Yes, I am being sarcastic.)

So, in the meantime, there is the constant BBC and Radio Free Europe update, some cautious analysis summarized on Reuters and the streaming coverage on the Wall Street Journal. There are other live reports in the British media as well (and not just the BBC) so somewhere among all that we can all find information as it become available. You can also follow the news on various Kremlin controlled sources such as Russia Today, which has just lost its London correspondent because of her unhappiness in the way the story was covered. What on earth had she been doing until now?

Mostly I despair

Mostly but not always. Mostly I despair of the eurosceptic movement and all who sail in it, particularly when questions outside their tiny little world come up. Or, in other words, I do not think the overwhelming proportion of eurosceptics can or want to understand what is going on in various parts of the world. It is all too difficult and, therefore, they relate everything to what they think they know (but actually rarely do as nothing happens in isolation). So, just as the left has to relate everything to the evil American empire so a large proportion of eurosceptics has to relate everything to the EU, whether that benighted organization is of any relevance or not. As a consequence, the insanely anti-American left and right (a smidgeon more insane than the left), a number of Conservative politicians who have learnt nothing from the second half of the twentieth century and a very large proportion of self-accredited eurosceptics have been cheering for President Putin and his jolly Chekists as they invaded Ukraine, took away a part of it, Crimea and sent in more troops in funny clothes to link up with local separatists in order to destabilize parts of eastern Ukraine.

You'd think that people who are in favour of national sovereignty, especially based on an agreement that was created when a forcibly united multi-national state based on ideology fell apart, would actually support one of them when it is under attack. Well, you'd be wrong. A curious misreading of what happened in Ukraine has led a number of eurosceptics helter-skelter into the ranks of the Putinistas who appear to be in favour of the recreation of a new Soviet Union in the shape of the Eurasian Union. (Fortunately for many of us, not to mention the people of the former Soviet Union, Russia as led and destroyed by Vlad and his mates is not in a fit state to impose its rule on the others though it is quite capable of the aforementioned territorial invasion and destabilization.)

Why am I not in total despair? Well, it always cheers me when I read an article that clearly understand the issues and does not mince its language. Such an article is in July/August's issue of Standpoint and it is by my good friend (full disclosure) Michael Mosbacher.

He lambasts the insane and Stalinist left and insane right in equal measure but what is particularly painful from my point of view is his well-argued and fully justified attack on the Bruges Group that, in my absence from its counsels, seems to have gone slightly mad.

Whether intentionally or not, the Eurosceptic Bruges Group has become an apologist for Putin. The group was established in 1989 to support the views expounded by Margaret Thatcher in her Bruges speech of the previous year calling for an end to the federalist project and a more decentralised Europe. It has now produced Someone Had Blunder'd, a 30-minute film attacking UK and EU policy on Ukraine for provoking Russia, indeed for being the cause of the current crisis. It is fronted by Bruges Group director Robert Oulds and features Conservative MPs Peter Bone, Bernard Jenkin and John Redwood, twice a leadership candidate, as well as erstwhile party chairman Lord Tebbit. They are now exploring a follow-up film with Sir Bill Cash MP.

The argument of these critics is that, in the phrase of Bernard Jenkin, the Euro-neocons — surely as mythical a beast as any yet imagined — running the EU have pursued an aggressive policy of eastward expansion which has encroached on Russia's sphere of influence and thus made it feel threatened. In their view it is the EU's rather than Russia's expansionism which has provoked conflict. Jenkin argues that the EU has been "fomenting divisions in order to bring Ukraine into the European orbit". Redwood says: "It was EU action seeking to expand their empire to the West [sic] which first started the reaction of Russia."

To be honest none of the participants of the film are people to whom I would turn for elucidation of any question of foreign affairs, let alone those to do with the former Soviet Union. What the egregious John Redwood might have meant by his comment is anybody's guess as is Bernard Jenkin's invention of the mythical and meaningless Euro-neocons.

Mr Mosbacher explanation of what happened and what role the EU played at the very beginning of the crisis (after which it became irrelevant as I have mentioned a few times before) is accurate:

It is true that the demonstrations against Yanukovych began last November when he announced that he would not be signing an Association Agreement with the EU but would instead throw in his lot with Putin's Eurasian Customs Union.

The critics are right that the Association Agreement is much more than a free-trade agreement. In Article Seven it commits Ukraine to "promote gradual convergence in the area of foreign and security policy". Article Ten of the agreement provides for "increasing the participation of Ukraine in EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations" and exploring the potential of military-technological cooperation.

The agreement may indeed undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, but surely is nothing compared to the Russian-dominated Eurasian Customs Union. While the latter may on paper be nothing more than a customs union does anyone seriously believe that it will remain as such? Has Putin's aggression in Ukraine not rather proven the point that Ukrainian sovereignty is not high on his list of priorities?

Clearly, it is not high on the average eurosceptic's list of priorities either (that is, assuming, they know where Ukraine is, something I am doubtful of).

There is also a well deserved attack on the Conservatives and their allies in the Council of Europe and its preposterous Parliamentary Assembly.  Read the whole piece.  The title? Putin Has His Useful Idiots on the Left and the Right.

Clearing the ground - 2

Time to recall the somewhat obscure fact that there are other countries outside the European Union and that they have political events as well. First up, Ukraine, which held a presidential election today though in some parts voting was disrupted severely by pro-Russian separatists. Actually, it is hard to call them pro-Russian because they are not particularly in favour of things Russian, merely in favour (or so they think) of detaching whatever little bit of land they know and attaching it to Russia, whether anybody else likes the idea or not.

Based on exit polls, the Chocolate King, Petro Poroshenko has won an outright victory in the first round with 55.9 per cent of the vote. I have seen some rejoicing among people who still see the Ukrainian problem merely in EU terms as they consider Poroshenko to be pro-Western. This is simplifying the situation. Poroshenko is not exactly an outsider: he is an oligarch who did well under the previous regime (all the previous regimes) and was a Minister in Yanukovich's government. Not a leader of the opposition but a man who is seen as pragmatic and pro-western for good economic and political reasons.

In many ways he is but he is a wily fox and knows full well that he will have to do business with his neighbour in the east. It seems that Yulia Tymoshenko is a distant second, which should not surprise anyone who recalls her disastrous term of political power, regardless of what happened to her under Yanukovich's rule.

Was it really a good idea to take Crimea away and stir up trouble in other places?

No polling stations were open in Donetsk city, and across the region only seven out of 12 district electoral commissions were operating. The separatists are in control of large areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Or, in other words, areas that might have voted for a more pro-Russian candidate were taken out of the equation. Yet another miscalculation on the part of the man a surprising number of people in the West consider to be a political genius. Yes, I am talking about President Putin, the hero of numerous eurosceptics. Though it is true, as the Financial Times points out that the absence of much of eastern Ukraine from the poll, may give the Russian President the excuse not to recognize the results and continue to subvert his neighbour to the west.

It also looks quite likely that the former heavyweight boxing champion and leader of opposition forces, Vitali Klitschko will be the new Mayor of Kyiv.

Let us also not forget that presidential elections are about to happen in Egypt though most of us can work out who is likely to win those. President Sissi may not the worst option for Egypt, Arab Spring or no Arab Spring.

A few additional comments

Is it not extraordinary how many people who would not be able to tell the difference between Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv, let alone place them on the map, have now become experts on Ukrainian matters? It takes all my time just to avoid having discussions with them as these can lead nowhere.

Rumours about what is going on in Crimea abound with the Kremlin insisting the troops moved in to protect Russian civilians though no evidence of any attacks has been offered. Plus there was this:

Russia's military has given Ukrainian forces in Crimea until dawn on Tuesday to surrender or face an assault, Ukrainian defence sources have said.

The head of Russia's Black Sea Fleet Aleksander Vitko set the deadline and also threatened two warships, Ukrainian officials said.

However, Interfax news agency later quoted a fleet spokesman who denied that any ultimatum had been issued.

Whom to believe? I suppose we shall know by tomorrow morning.

Meanwhile, here are a few links worthy following up. An interesting analysis by Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russian history and security. Having written before that he did not think Putin would take the Crimea because that would not be in his interests, he is now wondering whether the man has actually gone too far to draw back.

What, one might ask, is Moscow’s endgame? What does it want, and how likely is it to get it. The more it radicalises Kyiv, the less likely it is to get some wider political settlement. Instead, it might be forced to take Crimea if for no other reason than that it has to be seen to accomplish something, even if this is a pyrrhic victory, one which will only hurt Russia.

Here, after all, is the perverse and twisted irony of the situation. Strictly from a coldly logical position (and I am not advocating this, I should add), in many ways it is in Kyiv’s interests for Moscow to steal Crimea, and turn it into some pseudo-state or new part of the Russian Federation. Ukraine loses a sunny peninsula, but also a distinct drain on the state’s coffers (the Crimean economy is not great, and the region receives net subsidies from the centre). It sheds the most troublesome and Russophile of its regions, one which has been a turbulent locus of trouble for Kyiv for most of post-Soviet Ukraine’s history. It also gets concrete proof of the threat it faces from Russian bullying and probably accelerated and solicitous assistance from the US, EU, NATO, etc. It also validates every Ukrainian fear about Russia.

The question "what is Moscow's endgame" has been asked with increasing bewilderment by many people who actually do know where all those Ukrainian cities are.

Vladimir Kara-Murza's piece is a few days old but is still worth reading though I suspect there is a certain amount of wishful thinking there. Also a reminder by Timothy Snyder, who has been writing the best informed articles on the subject, that rearranging borders, hardly an unknown event in history, is fraught with difficulties, not least because other people might get the same idea. In this case, China might decide something not dissimilar in Siberia.

So what else is happening? The UN Security Council is meeting as we speak and NATO intends to have another meeting tomorrow. The EU is sending various threats though the UK for one has announced that it has no intention of breaking business relations with Russia and, presumably, of denying various visas to people who had voted to give the President the right to send troops into Ukraine.

The market has reacted though, as Russia is not the Soviet Union and is not outside world economy and the market forces. The rouble has hit a new low and the value of stocks and shares on the Moscow stock exchange has plummeted. Again.

As it happens, there is another player on the scene, one with historic connection to Crimea and that is Turkey. Various members of the Turkish government have been calling for the continued existence of a united Ukraine and for a restoration of stability. According to the Foreign Ministry, Turkey will do everything possible to ensure that Crimea remains in Ukraine. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has visited Kyiv, and has held meetings with the acting President, various other politicians and Former Chairman of The Crimean Tatars National Assembly and Ukrainian Deputy Mustafa Abdulcemil Kirimoglu. Apparently, it was a closed meeting so anything could have been decided. Will Turkey suddenly emerge as the protector of the Crimean Tatars?

Hard to keep up

Events in Ukraine and, especially, in Crimea have been developing too fast for anyone to keep up except as a live blog, which I am in no position to do. It would appear that few people are even when they say they are live blogging.

So, here are a few thoughts and a few links:

Firstly, I think putting out the bunting for Ukraine the new democracy of Europe is a little premature. We have no real idea what the government is going to be like and who the President will be. Let me remind all my readers of the last successful Ukrainian democratic revolution, the Orange one around a decade ago. For the time being there is no particular reason to suppose that this one will fare any better than that one. Of course, it might, but we need to be a little wary and, above all, less demonstrative with our offers of cash for unknown purposes. Nor must we forget that among the many disparate opposition groups there are some very nasty ones and, at this stage, we do not know how much power or influence they will have. As to the latest heroine, Yuliya Tymoshenko, she is not an unknown quantity and was not a huge success in any way in her last reincarnation as a politician. In fact, as Edward Lucas points out, she was ruthless but incompetent and corrupt.

Secondly, Crimea, the most recent addition to Ukrainian territory. Through some whim of Khrushchev's Crimea was attached to Ukraine in 1954 (the second latest addition is western Ukraine or eastern Poland, which was added to the country in 1939 and, more definitively, 1944). It is majority Russian in population though there is the complication of the Crimean Tatars, deported by Stalin in 1944 and gradually and grudgingly allowed back in the eighties. They appear to be pro-Ukrainian though it is not at all clear how most of the peninsula's population feels on the subject. There is also a Russian naval base there and one of the accusations levelled at Russia by the acting Ukrainian President is that sailors and officers have been taking part in illegal military activity in various cities, thus breaking previous agreements about their behaviour.

For anyone who is interested in the background, bearing in mind that Crimea has been a bone of contention between Russia and Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union, here is a lengthy analysis by the Taras Kuzio, an expert on Ukraine, published in 2010. It has been suggested to me that the people of Crimea might not want to stay in Ukraine especially if some of the nastier elements of the opposition take over (unlike the nastier elements of Yanukovich's government). That is not impossible but why send in armed goons or organize some local ones to take over various important buildings in that case.

Who the armed goons are precisely still seems a little vague what with them wearing unarmed uniforms and coming up with different stories (this might clear up by the morning) but the idea that the Russian government is not involved at some level is very unlikely.

That leaves two questions: what on earth does Putin think he is doing and what on earth can the West do? The second question also includes such sub-headings as "did no-one (apart from Sarah Palin) anywhere near the top in politics think that something along these lines might happen? Apparently not, as there seem to be no plans at all and I do not think President Obama's vague threats show any planning. Before we go any further, let me announce quite categorically that I do not think we, any of us should consider going to war with Russia. But is there anything we can do? Well, yes, as it happens there is but I doubt we shall.

We can push Russia out of the G8 and return to it being G7. Oddly enough, that would hurt. Also, as several people have suggested, we should impose personal sanctions on various members of the Russian elite: no more visas, no more property buying in Britain or the United States, no more shopping in the West, no more places for their offspring in our boarding schools, which can probably survive without them. Other ideas will occur as we go along.

As to Putin's actions, I can only surmise that he really has gone off the rocker. Russia is in no condition to wage a war against Ukraine and what good would come of it, in any case? Even detaching Crimea and annexing it to Russia is fraught with future problems for Russia and it state. Timothy Snyder is well worth reading on the subject. Among other things he points out that it is Russian foreign policy that turned what was going to be a temporary demonstration into a full scale riot and, if not a revolution precisely, certainly an upheaval and a loss of a good ally in the shape of Yanukovich. (Mind you, I think Yanukovich's own stupidity did not help there.)

There is more.

If Russia excludes its own borders from the general international standard of inviolability, it might face some unwanted challenges down the road. If Russia's external frontiers are flexible zones, to be pushed in various ways with appeals to the rights of ethnic brethren and passport holders, then what will happen, down the line, in Russia's eastern Siberia? There, Russia holds major natural resources along its border with China, the world's longest. Some 6 million Russian citizens in eastern Siberia face 90 million Chinese in China's bordering provinces.

Beijing pays attention to Ukraine because it has a major stake in Ukrainian agricultural territories. It will likely note the developing Russian doctrine on the flexibility of Russia's external borders. China also has a stake in eastern Siberia. It needs fresh water, hydrocarbons, mineral resources such as copper and zinc, and fertile soil for its farmers. The Chinese economic relationship with eastern Siberia is a colonial one: China buys raw materials and sells finished goods. Beijing actually invests more in eastern Siberia than does Moscow. No one knows the exact number of Chinese citizens in eastern Siberia -- in part because the last Russian census declined to count them -- but it certainly dwarfs the number of Russians in Crimea, and is expected by Russian analysts to increase significantly with time.

In general, one would say that moving around borders is not a good idea unless you have worked out a number of steps ahead. The Russians are always described as chess players and many of them are but it does not appear that Vlad and his friends have looked at the board too carefully.

That is as far as one can go at the moment.

The EU's role in Ukraine's problems

This is still not a long posting about Ukraine but I noticed that at least one person has said something I've been saying almost since the Ukrainian events began: the EU is of no relevance to anything that happens in that country. President Yanukovich's refusal to initial the trade agreement last year may well have triggered off the first demonstrations but it all developed into a general discontent with the government, the political system, the corruption and the general dysfunctionality of the country. The fact that there are demonstrations and discontents in the east of the country, in the areas that are generally pro-Russian and where Yanukovich was supposed have a great deal of support is indicative of that.

Fortunately for my self-esteem the person voicing similar opinions is Andrey Kurkov, Ukraine's best and funniest modern novelist, whose political satire, Death and the Penguin, captured readers' imagination in many parts of the world.

According to him, the not-so fragrant Cathy Ashton, the High Panjandrum of EU foreign policy is not known in Ukraine at all and nobody hears of her shuttling back and forth, repeatedly announcing a break-through or lack of one.

“There is not much information about their visits and most people don’t know who they are. Among those who do know, quite a lot of them think they do not take Ukraine seriously, that they come here to show their own public that they care about what’s going on,” he said.

He noted the EU diplomats get coverage almost exclusively on internet media.

All of that is true enough but the question remains: exactly what can the EU do to sort out what is an internal Ukrainian crisis growing out of the country's internal problems? Individually, we can support the opposition, assuming we know what they want but will that make any difference? The question Ukraine faces comes in two parts: will it be Russia's colony or will it be an independent democracy that looks to the West while, obviously, not losing her links with Russia, an impossibility in any case: and, secondly, will it be another post-Soviet autocracy like almost all the successor states or will it finally become what it should always have been:a constitutional democracy that relies on the rule of law? Where, in all that, is the European Union?

Meanwhile ....

I am in the middle of a long (probably too long) blog about Ukraine that, I suspect, will please no-one. In the meantime, I thought I would point out that the EU has not been completely helpless and inactive. No, indeed, it sent its Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle last week to Kiyiv to meet with President Yanukovich and with Arseniy Yatsenyuk of Batkivshchyna, Vitali Klitchko of Udar, and Oleh Tyahnybok of Svoboda, leaders of the three main opposition parties (there are a few more and therein lies one of the problems). On his return, the Commissioner produced this memo:

I conveyed the deep concerns of the EU about the latest developments and underlined the need to end the cycle of violence, to fight against impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations and to continue an inclusive national dialogue to find a way out of the crisis that threatens to further destabilise the country.

Well, that should solve it. More is to come. The egregious and not even very fragrant Cathy Ashton, the EU's High Panjandrum on foreign affairs has been so alarmed by stories that the Ukrainian government is planning a state of emergency that she has pushed her own visit there forward and is going today (Tuesday). No doubt she will know exactly what to say. After all, she managed to put out a statement on the occasion of International Holocaust Memorial Day that somehow did not mention Jews even once. Personally, I think that is stupidity on her and her officials' part but there might be other explanations.

An odd take on Ukrainian events

The Ukrainian situation at present is both complex and somewhat opaque, the latter meaning that it is not clear where any of it is going. The general opinion seems to be that Putin has won against the EU and the West in general though that requires some qualification.

In the first place, it is not entirely clear what an EU would have consisted of. Presumably, the initialling of the trade and closer co-operation agreement, which would have given very little to either side. Contrary to what many people seem to believe, membership of the EU was not and is not on offer.

Secondly, winning "hearts and minds" by a combination of a huge bribe that the EU could not possibly top and blackmail over energy supplies works in the short term but trouble is not simply brewing, it is there already. Those demonstrators in Kiyiv may not know exactly what they want or how they are going to achieve what they might think they want but they do know what they don't want and that is closer relations with Russia. The fact that there is a very large minority in Ukraine that makes up almost half the population who do want closer relations with Russia and are suspicious of the EU makes that country an unreliable ally for all, including Russia.

Thirdly, Ukraine is largely dysfunctional and the EU already has dysfunctional members. No more are needed. The problems need to be sorted out by the Ukrainians themselves with possible help from the West but that help would be limited. Of course, moving more definitely into Russia's orbit means that the country will remain dysfunctional but signing that agreement with the EU would not have made any difference from that point of view.

In other words, the whole situation is a mess and Putin's victory is Pyrrhic at best. Indeed, some people might say that it is time he started paying attention to what is going on in his own country, especially after the horrific double explosions of Volgograd that follow on a number of other explosions and terrorist acts throughout the year. (Whoever is responsible for what happened yesterday and today, they were still terrorist acts.)

Having said all that, I do find it slightly odd that a school of thought is developing that calls all this something of a diplomatic success for the EU. Andrew Rettman outlines the sequence of events, which ended in Yanukovich and the EU mutually discarding and reviling each other but, curiously, he also says:

The EU this year lost a battle for Ukraine, but nobody is laughing at its soft power any more.

More like sneering, I'd say. The one thing we can say for certain: neither in Ukraine nor anywhere else has EU soft power achieved anything in the last year (or any other year). That Ukrainians do not want to be in the orbit of President Putin's dysfunctional, lawless and bullying country is not much of an achievement for the EU as nothing very much seems to come out of that.

Meanwhile, Leonid Bershidsky speculates on the Bloomberg site as to why President Putin has been so laggardly in his response to the terrorist outrages in Volgograd when other heads of state and government managed to make statements of condolence and condemnation almost immediately. One imagines that when his statement is made it will be tough and full of nasty language. Also, if past experience is to go by, any suspects will be killed by the security services before they can get anywhere near a trial.

The highly effective Cathy Ashton

Cathy Ashton (Baroness Ashton) is the High Panjandrum of EU foreign policy and, as such, spends a great deal of money on her staff and on jetting round the world talking to people and settling issues according to her and her minions.

Since the nearest issue to be settled is in Ukraine, off she went there.

The European Commission released a statement regarding the topic in Brussels on Sunday.

"He [Barroso] recalled the need to respect and to exert maximum restraint. He announced that the High Representative/Vice-President, Catherine Ashton, would travel to Kiеv this week to support a way out of the political crisis," the statement said.

Jolly good. Alas, things worked out slightly differently. Yesterday the Ukrainian police moved against the camping protesters in Kiyiv and clashes broke out, the police taking the central square just hours after the High Panjandrum arrived in the city.

As EUObserver puts it: Ukraine police attack protesters under Ashton's nose.

According to the BBC's latest report both the police and the protesters have pulled back from their previous positions and the Interior Minister Vitali Zakharchenko has promised no use of force and called on everyone to calm down. More people are pouring into the city to lend support and solidarity to those already there but  it seems unlikely that President Yanukovich will do a U-turn on his previous U-turn. And if he does? What will happen if other demonstrators come out demanding that he stick to his agreement with Russia? Will Cathy Ashton make another trip to produce a political solution?

Slightly odd that this has not happened before

The demonstrators in Kiyiv have pulled down a statue of Lenin (maybe THE statue of Lenin). A little strange it was still there.

More about Holodomor

When I sent my friend Olga Kerziouk, Curator of Ukrainian Studies at the British Library, a link to my posting on Holodomor, she sent me one in response. Her own blog on the subject appeared yesterday on the BL's very fine European studies blog and is very well worth reading. She talks about the many books and studies that are available about the subject (if only the other parts of the former Soviet Union were so diligent about studying the horrors of Collectivization), so there really is NO excuse for ignorance. And yet it agrees.

I am particularly impressed by Olga's last sentence:

Light a candle tomorrow on Holodomor Memorial Day to the memory of millions of people who died from the starvation on Europe’s most fertile black soil.

It never recovered fully. The bread basket of Europe became a complete basket case.

For those who really want to feel traumatized, here is an opera about the Holodomor by Virko Baley, who worked on it for 30 years, which was premiered in Las Vegas this year.